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Perceptual events derive their significance to an animal from their meaning about the world, that is from the information they
carry about their causes. The brain should thus be able to efficiently infer the causes underlying our sensory events. Here we
use multisensory cue combination to study causal inference in perception. We formulate an ideal-observer model that infers
whether two sensory cues originate from the same location and that also estimates their location(s). This model accurately
predicts the nonlinear integration of cues by human subjects in two auditory-visual localization tasks. The results show that
indeed humans can efficiently infer the causal structure as well as the location of causes. By combining insights from the study
of causal inference with the ideal-observer approach to sensory cue combination, we show that the capacity to infer causal
structure is not limited to conscious, high-level cognition; it is also performed continually and effortlessly in perception.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are walking in the forest and you see a sudden
movement in the bushes. You may infer that this movement was
caused by a hidden animal, but you may also consider a gust of
wind as an alternative and possibly more probable cause. If you
are a hungry predator–or a life-loving prey–this estimation may be
critical to your survival. However, you may also hear an animal
vocalization coming from a similar direction. Combining both
pieces of sensory information, you will be better at judging if there
is an animal in the bushes and if so, where exactly it is hiding.
Importantly, the way how you will combine pieces of information
must depend on the causal relationships you inferred. This
example illustrates that perceptual cues are seldom ecologically
relevant by themselves, but rather acquire their significance
through their meaning about their causes. It also illustrates how
cues from multiple sensory modalities can be used to infer
underlying causes. The nervous system is constantly engaged in
combining uncertain information from different sensory modalities
into an integrated understanding of the causes of sensory
stimulation.
The study of multisensory integration has a long and fruitful
history in experimental psychology, neurophysiology, and psycho-
physics. Von Helmholtz, in the late 19
th century started
considering cue combination, formalizing perception as uncon-
scious probabilistic inference of a best guess of the state of the
world [1]. Since then, numerous studies have analyzed the way
people use and combine cues for perception [e.g. 2,3], highlighting
the rich set of effects that occur in multimodal perception.
Over the last decade, many scientists have gone back to
a probabilistic interpretation of cue combination as had been
proposed by von Helmholtz. These probabilistic models formalize
the problem of cue combination in an elegant way. It is assumed
that there is a single variable in the outside world (e.g., the position
of an animal) that is causing the cues (auditory and visual
information). Each of the cues is assumed to be a noisy observation
of this underlying variable. Due to noise in sensation, there is some
uncertainty about the information conveyed by each cue and
Bayesian statistics is the systematic way of predicting how subjects
could optimally infer the underlying variables from the cues.
Several recent studies have demonstrated impressive fits to
psychophysical data, starting from the assumption that human
performance is close to the ideal defined by probabilistic models
[4–7]. In these experiments, cues tend to be close to each other in
time, space, and structure, providing strong evidence for there
only being a single cause for both cues. In situations where there is
only a single underlying cause, these models formalize the central
idea of probabilistic inference of a hidden cause.
A range of experiments have shown effects that are hard to
reconcile with the single-cause (i.e., forced-fusion) idea. Auditory-
visual integration breaks down when the difference between the
presentation of the visual and the auditory stimulus is large [8–10].
Such a distance or inconsistency is called disparity. Increasing
disparity, for example by moving an auditory stimulus farther
away from the position of a visual stimulus, reduces the influence
each stimulus has on the perception of the other [11–14].
Throughout this paper we only consider spatial disparity along
the azimuthal axis. When subjects are asked to report their
percepts in both modalities on the same trial, one can measure the
influence that the two senses have on each other [13]. The data
from such a dual-report paradigm show that, although at small
disparities there is a tendency to integrate, greater disparity makes
it more likely that a subject responds differently in both modalities.
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a single cue or several cues they give answers that intuitively make
a lot of sense: if two events are close to each other in space, time,
and structure, subjects tend to perceive a single underlying cause,
while if they are far away from one another subjects tend to infer
two independent causes [15,16]. If cues are close to one another,
they interact and influence the perception of each other, whereas
they are processed independently when the discrepancy is large.
New modeling efforts have made significant progress at
formalizing the interactions between two cues. These models
assume that there exist two relevant variables in the world, for
example the position of a visual and the position of an auditory
stimulus. The visual and auditory cues that reach the nervous
system are noisy versions of the underlying visual and auditory
variables. The models further assume an ‘‘interaction prior’’,
a joint prior distribution that defines how likely each combination
of visual and auditory stimuli is in the absence of any evidence.
This prior formalizes that the probability of both positions being
the same (related to a common cause) is high in comparison to the
positions being different from one another. This prior in effect
determines the way in which two modalities influence each other.
Very good fits to human performance have been shown for the
combination of two cues [13,14,17,18]. These studies assume an
interaction between processing in each modality and derive
predictions of human performance from this idea.
Von Helmholtz did not only stress the issue of probabilistic
inference but also that multiple objects may be the causes of our
sensations [19,20]. In other words, any two sensory signals may
either have a common cause, in which case they should be
integrated, or have different, independent causes, in which case
they should be processed separately. Further evidence for this idea
comes from a study that showed that by providing evidence that
two signals are related it is possible to incite subjects to more
strongly combine two cues [21]. The within-modality binding
problem is another example where causal inference is necessary
and the nervous system has to determine which set of stimuli
correspond to the same object and should be bound together [22–
24]. We are usually surrounded by many sights, sounds, odors, and
tactile stimuli, and our nervous system constantly needs to estimate
which signals have a common cause. The nervous system
frequently needs to solve problems where it needs to interpret
sensory signals in terms of potential causes.
In this paper we formalize the problem of causal inference as
well as integration versus segregation in multisensory perception as
an optimal Bayesian observer that not only infers source location
from two sensory signals (visual, sV, and auditory, sA) but also
whether the signals have a common cause (C). This inference is
complicated by the fact that the nervous system does not have
access to the source locations of the signals but only to noisy
measurements thereof (visual, xV, and auditory, xA). From these
noisy observations it needs to infer the best estimates of the source
locations (S ˆ
V and S ˆ
A). All this needs to happen in the presence of
uncertainnty about the presence of a common cause (C). To take
into account multiple possible causal structures, we need a so-
called mixture model [e.g. 24], but one of a very specific form.
The model assumes that the underlying variables (azimuthal
stimulus positions) cause the sensory inputs. The model considers
two hypotheses, either that there is a common cause or that there
are independent causes. The optimal observer model defines how
the cues might actually be combined (i.e., in a statistically optimal
manner). In the model, cues are fused if the cues have one
common cause and segregated if they have independent causes.
The model typically has uncertainty about the causal interpreta-
tion, in which case it will adjust its cue combination continuously
depending on the degree of belief about the causal structure.
This model makes three important predictions: (1) It predicts
the circumstances under which subjects should perceive a common
cause or independent causes. (2) It predicts if the individual cues
should be fused or if they should be processed separately. (3) It
predicts how the cues are combined if they are combined. Here we
test the predictions of the model and analyze how well it predicts
human behavior.
RESULTS
Causal Bayesian inference
We model situations in which observers are presented with
simultaneous auditory and visual stimuli, and are asked to report
theirlocation(s).Ifthevisualandtheauditorystimulihaveacommon
cause (Fig. 1, left), subjects could use the visual cue to improve the
Figure 1. The causal inference model. Left: One cause can be responsible for both cues. In this case the visually perceived position xV will be the
common position s perturbed by visual noise with width sV and the auditory perceived position will be the common position perturbed by auditory
noise with width sA. Right: Alternatively, two distinct causes may be relevant, decoupling the problem into two independent estimation problems.
The causal inference model infers the probability of a causal structure with a common cause (left, C=1) versus the causal structure with two
independent causes (right, C=2) and then derives optimal predictions from this. We introduce a single variable C which determines which sub-model
generates the data.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000943.g001
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usually surrounded by multiple sources of sensory stimulation and
hence multiple sights and sounds. Therefore the nervous system
cannot simply combine all signals into a joint estimate; it must infer
which signals have a common cause and only integrate those.
Specifically, for any pair of visual and auditory stimuli, it should also
consider the alternative possibility that they are unrelated and co-
occurred randomly (Fig. 1, right).
Here we developed an ideal observer that estimates the positions
of cues and also whether they have a common cause. This causal
inference model uses two pieces of information. One piece is the
likelihood: the sensed visual and auditory positions, which are
corrupted by noise. Because perception is corrupted by noise, any
sensory stimulus does not reveal the true visual position, but rather
induces a distribution of where the stimulus could be, given the
stimulus. The other piece of information is the prior: from
experience we may know how likely two co-occurring signals are
to have a common cause versus two independent causes. The causal
inference model combines those pieces of information to estimate if
there isa commoncause andtoestimate thepositionsof cues (see the
Methods section and Supporting Information for details, Text S1).
The causal inference model depends on four parameters
characterizing the knowledge about the environment and the
observer’s sensory systems: the uncertainty of vision (sV) and
audition (sA); knowledge the observer has about the spatial layout
of objects, in particular how much the observer expects that
objects are more likely to be located centrally (sP, introduced to
formalize that subjects have a bias to perceive stimuli straight
ahead); and the prior probability that there is a single cause versus
two causes (pcommon). These four parameters are fit to human
behavior in psychophysical experiments (see Methods for details).
Experiment 1: Auditory-visual spatial localization
Experienced ventriloquists move a puppet’s mouth in synchrony
with their speech patterns, creating a powerful illusion of a talking
puppet. This effect is a classical demonstration of auditory-visual
integration, where subjects infer that there is only a single cause
(the puppet’s talking) for both visual (puppet’s facial movements)
and auditory (speech) stimuli. Numerous experimental studies
have analyzed this kind of auditory-visual cue integration and
found situations in which the cues are combined and situations in
which they are processed separately [2,3,7,8,10,15,25–27]. To test
the causal inference model, we use a laboratory version of the
ventriloquist illusion, in which brief auditory and visual stimuli are
presented simultaneously with varying amounts of spatial
disparity. We use the dual-report paradigm which was introduced
recently to study auditory-visual numerosity judgment [13],
because this provides information about the joint auditory-visual
percepts of subjects.
Nineteen subjects participated in the experiment. On each trial,
subjects were presented with either a brief visual stimulus in one of
five locations along azimuth, or a brief tone at one of the same five
locations, or both simultaneously (see Methods for details). The task
was toreportthelocation of the visual stimulusas wellas the location
of the sound in each trial using two button presses (Fig. 2a).
We found that subjects show large variability across trials,
shown in Fig 2b for an auditory stimulus at the central location. If
subjects would not be affected by noise then we would expect a plot
that has 100% of the trials as a press of the button corresponding
to the central location. Instead we see a wide distribution,
highlighting the presence of uncertainty in auditory perception. All
modern theories of cue combination predict that two cues,
presented simultaneously, will influence one another and lead to
a bimodal precision that is better than the unimodal precision, as
the other cue can be used to reduce uncertainty. Indeed, we found
that the visual stimulus influences the estimate of the auditory
stimulus when the auditory stimulus is held at a fixed location
(Fig. 2b, yellow versus gray). Moreover, we find that vision does
have an influence on the perception of the auditory stimulus and
a visual stimulus to the left biases perception to the left (Fig 2b, red
versus yellow). Subjects thus base their estimate of the auditory
position on both visual and auditory cues. Moreover, subjects’
estimates of the auditory position often differ from their estimates
of the visual position.
To examine whether the causal inference model can account for
the full range of cue combination observed in human multisensory
perception, wemakeuse ofboththe auditory and thevisualresponse
frequencies we measured in our experiment (Fig. 2c). Four
parameters were used to fit 250 data points (25 bisensory conditions,
2 modalities, 5 buttons per modality). The causal inference model
accounts for the data very well (R
2=0.97; R
2 is calculated as the
explained variance divided by the total variance) (Fig. 2c,d). One
interesting finding is that the response distribution generally only has
one peak (in Fig 2c), but its position and skewness is affected by the
position of the other stimulus. The model shows this effect because it
does not simply decide if there is a common cause or individual
causes but considers both possibilities on each trial.
To facilitate quantitative comparison of the causal inference
model with other models, we fitted the parameters individually to
each subject’s data using a maximum-likelihood procedure: we
maximized the probability of the data under the model. For each
subject, the best fit from 6 different sets of initial parameter values
was used, to reduce the effect of these initial values. We did this for
several different models that use previously proposed interaction
priors as well as the prior derived from causal inference. We first
considered two special cases of the causal inference model: pure
integration (causal inference with pcommon=1) and pure segrega-
tion (causal inference with pcommon=0). We then considered two
two-dimensional ad hoc priors that have been proposed in other
papers. Roach et al. [18] proposed a two-dimensional (auditory-
visual) prior that is defined as the sum of a Gaussian ridge along
the diagonal, and a constant. This prior is somewhat similar to the
causal inference prior as the constant relates to events that are
independent and the Gaussian relates to sensory events that are
related and thus have a common cause. Bresciani et al [14] used
a special case of the Roach et al. prior ( The Shams et al. model
(Shams et al, 2005) was not considered as it involves a prior
specified by a large number of parameters (25)). where no constant
is added to the Gaussian. According to the Bresciani prior, visual
and auditory positions that are very far away from each other are
extremely unlikely. According to the Roach prior, such two
positions have a fixed, non-vanishing probability.
In the comparison, we obtain the predicted response distribu-
tion by integrating out the internal variables instead of equating it
to the posterior distribution. This is the correct way of solving this
Bayesian problem and differs from the approach taken in previous
papers [13,14,18] (although it only affects predictions in the Roach
et al. model). We measure the goodness of fit obtained from these
priors relative to that obtained from the causal inference prior,
using the log likelihood over the entire data set. The resulting log
likelihood ratios are shown in Table 1. The causal inference model
fits the data better than the other models. We also compare with
an alternative model that instead of minimizing the mean squared
error maximizes the probability of being correct and can exclude
this model based on the presented evidence.
The parameters found in the likelihood optimization of the
causal inference model are as follows. We found the visual system
to be relatively precise (sV=2.1460.22u) and the auditory system
Causal Inference
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have a modest prior estimating stimuli to be more likely to be
central (sP=12.361.1u). Subjects have the tendency of indicating
a direction that is straight ahead and the prior allows the model to
show such behavior as well. The average probability of perceiving
a common cause for visual and auditory stimuli is relatively low
(pcommon=0.2860.05u). This explained that the observed biases
are small in comparison to the values predicted if subjects were
certain that there is a common cause (Fig. 2e). In summary, the
causal inference model provides precise predictions of the way
people combine cues in an auditory-visual spatial localization task,
and it does so better than earlier models.
Figure 2. Combination of visual and auditory cues. a) The experimental paradigm is shown. In each trial a visual and an auditory stimulus is
presented simultaneously and subjects report both the position of the perceived visual and the position of the perceived auditory stimuli by button
presses. b) The influence of vision on the perceived position of an auditory stimulus in the center is shown. Different colors correspond to the visual
stimulus at different locations (sketched in warm to cold colors from the left to the right). The unimodal auditory case is shown in gray. c) The
averaged responses of the subjects (solid lines) are shown along with the predictions of the ideal observer (broken lines) for each of the 35 stimulus
conditions. These plot show how often on average which button was pressed in each of the conditions. d) The model responses from c) are plotted
with the human responses from c). e) The average auditory bias
^ s sA{sA
sV{sA
, i.e. the influence of deviations of the visual position on the perceived
auditory position is shown as a function of the spatial disparity (solid line) along with the model prediction (dashed line).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000943.g002
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index of crossmodal interactions. In our experiment, auditory
localization bias is a measure of the influence of vision on audition
and can be plotted as a function of the spatial disparity [15,16].
Like other authors, we find that the bias decreases with increasing
spatial disparity (Fig. 2e). Thus, the larger the distance between
visual and auditory stimuli, the smaller is the influence of vision on
audition. This result is naturally predicted by the causal inference
model: larger discrepancies make the single cause model less likely
as it would need to assume large noise values, which are unlikely.
A model in which no combination happens at all (pcommon=0)
cannot explain the observed biases (Fig. 2e) as it predicts a very
small bias (p,0.0001 t-test). The traditional forced-fusion model
[4–7,29] fails to explain much of the variance in Fig. 2c
(R
2=0.56). Moreover, this model would predict a very high
bias—as vision is much more precise than audition in our
experiment—and is ruled out by the bias data (Fig. 2e) (p,0.0001
t-test). Neither the traditional nor the no-interaction model can
explain the data, whereas the causal inference model can explain
the observed patterns of partial combination well (see Supporting
Information, Text S1 and Fig. S2 for a comparison with some
other recent models of cue combination).
Experiment 2: Auditory-visual spatial localization
with measured perception of causality
While the causal inference model accounts for the cue combination
data described above, it makes a prediction that goes beyond the
estimates of positions. If people infer the probability of common
cause then it should be possible to ask them if they perceive
a common cause versus two causes. A recent experiment asked this
question [15]. We compare the predictions of the causal inference
model with the reported data from this experiment. These
experiments differed in a number of important respects from our
experiment. Subjects were asked to report their perception of unity
(i.e., whether the two stimuli have a common cause or two
independent causes) on each trial. Only the location of the auditory
stimulus was probed. Subjects pointed towards the location of the
auditory stimulus instead of choosing a button to indicate the
position (see Methods, data analysis for figure 3, for details).
The results of these experiments [15] indicate that the closer the
visual stimulus is to the auditory stimulus, the more often do people
perceive them as having a common cause (Fig. 3a). However, even if
the two stimuli are close to one another, on some trials the noise in
the perception of the auditory stimulus will sometimes lead to the
perception of distinct causes. For example, a subject may hear the
sound at 10u even when both stimuli really are at 0u;o ns u c hat r i a l ,
the large perceived disparity may lead the subject to report distinct
causes.The model also showsthe trendthatwith increasing disparity
the probability of the perception of a common cause decreases. It
explains 72% of the variance in human performance (Fig. 3a) and
thus well models the human perception of causality.
We next examined how the perception of a common versus
distinct causes affects the estimation of the position of auditory
stimuli. The results indicate that when people perceive a common
cause they point to a position that is on average very close to the
position of the visual stimulus, and therefore the bias is high
(Fig. 3b). If, on the other hand, subjects perceive distinct causes,
they seem to not only rely on the auditory stimulus but seem to be
pushed away from the visual stimulus and exhibit negative bias. This
is a counterintuitive finding, as previous models [4–7,29] predict
only positive bias. Causal inference shows very similar behavior as
it also exhibits negative biases, and explains 87% of the variance of
the bias. The causal inference model thus accounts for the
counterintuitive negative biases.
How can an optimal system exhibit negative bias? We argue
that this is a selection bias stemming from restricting ourselves to
trials in which causes were perceived as distinct. To clarify this, we
consider, as an example, the case where the visual stimulus is 5u to
the right of the center and the auditory stimulus is in the center.
Table 1. Maximal log likelihood ratios (base e) across subjects
of models relative to causal inference model (mean6s.e.m.,
see methods for details).
......................................................................
Model Relative log likelihood
Causal inference 0
Causal inference with maximization 21163
Full integration 2311628
Full segregation 22567
Roach et al. 21866
Bresciani et al. 22266
For the last two entries, we used the prior proposed by Roach et al. and
Bresciani et al. together with correct inference (see text for more detail). All of
the maximal likelihood ratios in the table are considered decisive evidence in
favor of the causal inference prior, even when correcting for the number of
parameters using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) or the Bayesian
Information Criterion (BIC) [28]. These criteria are methods for enabling fair
comparison between models. Models with more parameters always fit data
better than models with fewer parameters. AIC and BIC are ways of correcting
for this bias.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000943.t001
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Figure 3. Reports of causal inference. a) The relative frequency of subjects reporting one cause (black) is shown (reprinted with permission from [15])
with the prediction of the causal inference model (red). b) The bias, i.e. the influence of vision on the perceived auditory position is shown (gray and
black). The predictions of the model are shown in red. c) A schematic illustration explaining the finding of negative biases. Blue and black dots
represent the perceived visual and auditory stimuli, respectively. In the pink area people perceive a common cause.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000943.g003
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lead to the internal representation of the auditory signal being
close to the visual signal and then the system infers a common
cause. On those trials, the auditory stimulus will be inferred to be
very close to the visual one, and the bias will be high (Fig. 3c red).
On other trials, the internal representation of the auditory signal
will, by chance, be far away from the visual signal, resulting in the
model inferring distinct causes. The distribution of perceived
auditory positions on these trials would be a truncated Gaussian
distribution, with the right part of the distribution (corresponding
to the perception of a common cause) cut away. This truncated
distribution has a negative mean and thus leads to a negative bias.
Due to this selection process, when a common cause is inferred,
the perceived auditory location must be close to the visual
stimulus, resulting in high bias. In contrast, when distinct causes
are inferred, the perceived auditory location must be far away
from the visual stimulus, and the bias thus becomes negative.
DISCUSSION
The causal inference model formalizes and addresses the problem
that had been phrased by von Helmholtz as ‘‘probabilistically
inferring the causes of cues’’. This refers to the general problem
that subjects are faced with: deciding which cues correspond to the
same source and which are unrelated to one another. The causal
inference model can predict both subjects’ unity judgments and
their stimulus estimates. Moreover, its interaction prior is similar
to the ones that have been proposed in earlier models that did not
model causal inference but only the interaction between cues
[13,14,17,18]. It thus provides an explanation for why models
utilizing an interaction prior have been successful at modeling
human performance.
In addition to providing a formalism that derives from a strong
normative idea, the causal inference model leads to better fits of
human performance in the auditory-visual localization task
presented here. Moreover, the causal inference model can make
direct predictions about the causal structure of sensory input that
would have been impossible with the previous models. Inference
about causal structure is an important element of the perceptual
binding of multisensory stimuli: when and how do sights and
sounds get paired into a unified conscious percept [22,30]? The
causal inference model presents a partial answer to this question.
As the causal inference model uses a single inference rule to
account for the entire spectrum of sensory cue combination, many
previous models are special cases of the model presented here,
including those showing statistical optimality of complete in-
tegration (pcommon=1) when the discrepancy between the signals is
small. In that case, the probability of a common cause given the
sensory cues will be close to 1.
It is necessary to discuss in which way we may expect subjects to
behave in an optimal way. We have shown that the assumption
that subjects optimally solve causal inference problems can well
predict many facets of their decision process. However, as has
often been argued [31,32], there is no reason why the nervous
system should be optimal under all circumstances. For problems of
high importance to everyday life, however, we should expect
evolution to have found a very good solution. For this range of
problems we should expect ideal observer models to make good
predictions of human behavior.
This leaves the question of what neural processes underlie the
causal inference computations that emerge at the behavioral level
as close to Bayes-optimal. Recent work has shed some light on this
issue for the case of complete integration (pcommon=1). It is well-
known that neural populations naturally encode probability
distributions over stimuli through Bayes’ rule, a type of coding
known as probabilistic population coding [33,34]. Under the
assumption of a common cause, optimal cue combination can be
implemented in a biologically realistic network using this type of
coding. Unexpectedly, this only requires simple linear operations
on neural activity [35]. This implementation makes essential use of
the structure of neural variability and leads to physiological
predictions for activity in areas that combine multisensory input,
such as the superior colliculus. Since complete integration is
a special case of causal inference, computational mechanisms for
the latter are expected to have a neural substrate that generalizes
these linear operations on population activities. A neural
implementation of optimal causal inference will be an important
step towards a complete neural theory of multisensory perception.
In the study of higher-level cognition, many experiments have
shown that people, starting from infancy, interpret events in terms
of the actions of hidden causes [36–40]. If we see a window
shatter, something or someone must have broken it; if a ball flies
up into the air, something launched it. It is particularly hard to
resist positing invisible common causes to explain surprising
conjunctions of events, such as the sudden occurrence of several
cases of the same rare cancer in a small town. These causal
inferences in higher-level cognition may seem quite different than
the causal inferences in sensory integration we have studied here:
more deliberate, consciously accessible, and knowledge-depen-
dent, rather than automatic, instantaneous, and universal. Yet an
intriguing link is suggested by our finding. The optimal statistical
principles that can explain causal inference in sensory integration
are very similar to those that have recently been shown to explain
more conventional hidden-cause inferences in higher-level cogni-
tion [39,41,42]. Problems of inferring common causes from
observed conjunctions arise everywhere across perception and
cognition, and the brain may have evolved similar or even
common mechanisms for performing these inferences optimally, in
order to build veridical models of the environment’s structure.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Paradigm for Experiment 1
Twenty naive subjects (undergraduate students at the California
Institute of Technology, ten male) participated in the experiment.
All subjects were informed of the purposes of the study and gave
written informed consent as approved by the local ethics
committee (Caltech Committee for the Protection of Human
Subjects). Subjects were seated at a viewing distance of 54 cm
from a 21-inch monitor. In each trial, subjects were asked to report
both the perceived visual and auditory positions using keyboard
keys 1 through 5, with 1 being the leftmost location and 5 the
rightmost. No feedback about the correctness of the response was
given. Visual and auditory stimuli were presented independently at
one of five positions. The five locations extended from 10u to the
left of the fixation point to 10u to the right of the fixation point at
5u intervals, along a horizontal line 5u below the fixation point,
Visual stimuli were 35 ms presentations of Gabor wavelets of high
contrast extending 2u on a background of visual noise. Auditory
stimuli, synchronized with the visual stimuli in the auditory-visual
conditions, were presented through a pair of headphones and
consisted of 35 ms white noise. Unisensory stimuli were also
presented, for which there was no presentation of stimulus for the
other modality. However, for the purposes of the modeling in
Fig. 2c we disregarded the unimodal data because of potential
attentional differences between bimodal and unimodal data. The
sound stimuli were filtered through a Head-Related Transfer
Function (HRTF), measured individually for each subject, using
methods similar to those described by http://sound.media.mit.edu/
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originating from the five spatial locations in the frontoparallel plane
where the visual stimuli were presented. The data from one subject
had to be discarded, as the fitted auditory variance of that subject
was 98u and the subject was therefore effectively deaf with respect to
the objective of our study. Apart from this subject, the HRTF
function yielded to good auditory precision in the range of 10u.
Generative model
A Bayesian approach based on a generative model requires one to
fully specify how the variables of interest are interrelated
statistically. This is done as follows. Determine if there is one
cause (C=1) versus two causes (C=2) by drawing from a binomial
distribution with p(C=1)=pcommon. Outside of the experiment this
will not be constant but depend on temporal delays, visual
experience, context, and many other factors. In the experiments
we consider all these factors are held constant so we can use a fixed
pcommon. If there is one cause (C=1), draw a position s from
a normal prior distribution N(0,sP), where N(m,sP) stands for
a normal distribution with mean m and standard deviation s.I ti s
thus more likely that a stimulus is centrally located than far to the
side. We then set sV=sand sA=s. If there are two causes (C=2),
draw positions sV and sA each independently from N(0,sP). We
assume that the visual and the auditory signal are corrupted by
unbiased Gaussian noise of standard deviations sV and sA,
respectively and draw xV from N(sV,sV) and xA from N(sA,sA).
The noise is thus assumed to be independent across modalities.
Estimating the probability of a common cause
An ideal observer is faced with the problem of inferring the causal
structure, i.e., whether there is one cause or there are two causes.
This inference is performed optimally using Bayes’ rule:
pC jxV,xA ðÞ ~
px V,xAjC ðÞ pC ðÞ
px V,xA ðÞ
ð1Þ
Here p(xA, xV) must be chosen such that p(C=1|xV, xA) and
p(C=2|xV, xA) add to 1, as we are dealing with probabilities. We
thus obtain:
pC ~1jxV,xA ðÞ ~
px V,xAjC~1 ðÞ pcommon
px V,xAjC~1 ðÞ pcommonzpx V,xAjC~2 ðÞ 1{pcommon ðÞ
ð2Þ
For p(xV, xA|C=1) we obtain
px V,xAjC~1 ðÞ ~
ð
px V,xAjs ðÞ ps ðÞ ds~
ð
px Vjs ðÞ px Ajs ðÞ ps ðÞ ds
ð3Þ
All three factors in this integral are Gaussians, allowing for an
analytic solution:
px V,xAjC~1 ðÞ ~
1
2p
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
s2
Vs2
Azs2
Vs2
Pzs2
As2
P
q
exp {
1
2
xV{xA ðÞ
2s2
Pz xV{mP ðÞ
2s2
Az xA{mP ðÞ
2s2
V
s2
Vs2
Azs2
Vs2
Pzs2
As2
P
"#
,
ð4Þ
where mP=0is the mean of the prior.
For p(xV, xA|C=2) we note that xV and xA are independent of
each other and we thus obtain a product of two factors:
px V,xAjC~2 ðÞ ~
ðð
px V,xAjsV,sA ðÞ ps V,sA ðÞ dsVdsA~
ð
px VjsV ðÞ ps V ðÞ dsV
   ð
px AjsA ðÞ ps A ðÞ dsA
   ð5Þ
Again, as all these distributions are assumed to be Gaussian, we
can write down an analytic solution,
px V,xAjC~2 ðÞ ~
1
2p
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
s2
Vzs2
p
  
s2
Azs2
p
   r
exp {
1
2
xV{mP ðÞ
2
s2
Vzs2
p
z
xA{mP ðÞ
2
s2
Azs2
p
 ! "# ð6Þ
For comparison with experimental data [15], we assume that the
model reports a common cause when p(C~1jxV,xA)w 1
2. The
estimation of a common cause amounts to a Bayesian model
selection problem. It is mathematically similar to a mixture model
for depth [24].
Optimally estimating the position
When estimating the position of the visual target, we assume
that making an error about the position of s in the case of
a common cause is just as bad as making an error in the estimate
of sV, and likewise for the position of the auditory target. We
assume that the cost in this estimation process is the mean squared
error [43]:
Cost~ ^ s sV{sV ðÞ
2z ^ s sA{sA ðÞ
2 ð7Þ
An optimal estimate for the subject is the estimate that leads to the
lowest expected cost under the subject’s posterior belief:
CostV~pC ~1jxV,xA ðÞ
ð
^ s sV{sV ðÞ
2p(sVjC~1,xV,xA)dsV
zpC ~2jxV,xA ðÞ
ð
^ s sV{sV ðÞ
2p(sVjC~2,xV,xA)dsV,
ð8Þ
where, S ˆ
V is the possible estimate. In general, when the cost
function is quadratic, the optimal estimation problem reduces to
the problem of finding the mean of the posterior distribution. The
estimate that minimizes the mean expected squared error in our
case is therefore:
^ s sV~pC ~1jxV,xA ðÞ ^ s sV,C~1z 1{pC ~1jxV,xA ðÞ ðÞ ^ s sV,C~2, ð9Þ
and
^ s sA~pC ~1jxV,xA ðÞ ^ s sA,C~1z 1{pC ~1jxV,xA ðÞ ðÞ ^ s sA,C~2, ð10Þ
where S ˆ
C=1and S ˆ
C=2are the best estimates we would obtain if we
were certain about there being one or two causes, respectively.
These conditionalized solutions are obtained by linearly weighing the
different cues proportional to their inverse variances [44], as
follows from the fact that the posterior is a product of Gaussians
and thus a Gaussian itself. Therefore, if we know if there is
a common or distinct causes we are able to analytically solve for
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coincides with the maximum-a-posteriori solution. The optimal
visual estimate when visual and auditory sources are different is the
same as when there would be only a visual signal, and likewise for
the auditory estimate:
^ s sV,C~2~
xV
s2
V
z
mP
s2
P
1
s2
V
z
1
s2
P
, ^ s sA,C~2~
xA
s2
A
z
mP
s2
P
1
s2
A
z
1
s2
P
, ð11Þ
When the sensory signals have a common cause, the optimal
solution is:
^ s sV,C~1~^ s sA,C~1~
xV
s2
V
z
xA
s2
A
z
mP
s2
P
1
s2
V
z
1
s2
A
z
1
s2
P
: ð12Þ
While these are both linear combinations of xV and xA, the
prefactors p(C|xV, xA) appearing in from Eqs. (9) and (10) are
nonlinear in these two variables. Therefore, the overall optimal
estimates S ˆ
V and S ˆ
A, when both common and independent causes
are possible, are no longer linear combinations. The traditional
way of studying the system by only measuring linear weights is not
sufficient to fully describe a system that performs causal inference.
The predicted distribution of visual positions is obtained
through marginalization:
p ^ s sVjsV,sA ðÞ ~
ðð
p ^ s sVjxV,xA ðÞ px VjsV ðÞ px AjsA ðÞ dxVdxA ð13Þ
These are the distributions which we can compare with
experimental data, the response distributions were obtained
through simulation (for more details see the Supporting In-
formation, Text S1 and Fig. S1).
In the simulation, we ran each condition (sV, sA) 10,000 times for
each subject. For each trial, we obtained estimates (S ˆ
V, S ˆ
A) in the
way described above. To link these estimates with our data in
which we have only five possible responses, we assume that people
press the button which is associated with the position closest to S ˆ.
This is equivalent to choosing the button that leads to the lowest
expected mean squared error between the position indicated by
the button and the position of the stimulus. This amounts to
allowing only estimated values S ˆ that are in the set {210u, 25u,
0u,5 u,1 0 u}. In this way, we obtained a histogram of responses for
each subject and condition. For the model comparison in Table 1,
we also considered a maximum-a-posteriori estimator, which does
not use a cost function but instead selects the location from the 5-
element response set that has the highest probability of being
correct. To link the causal inference model with the data on
causal inference [15] of figure 3 in the main text, we assume
additional motor noise with width smotor, that perturbs the
estimated position S ˆ.
A potential problem with any kind of optimization procedure
is the danger of over-fitting. To test for this with out model we
split the data set in two groups, each with half the data from
each subject. When optimizing on the first group, we find an
excellent performance of the model (R
2=0.98) and when we
transfer the optimized parameters to the second set of data, we
still find an excellent performance (R
2=0.96). Overfitting is
therefore not a problem with the causal inference model on this
data set.
Data Analysis for Figure 2
We choose pcommon, sP, sV, sA to maximize the probability of the
experimental data given the model. For the group analysis we
obtain these 4 parameters from a dataset obtained by pooling
together the data from all subjects. To obtain the histograms
plotted in Figure 2C we simulate the system for each combination
of cues for 10,000 times. It is a common mistake [e.g. 13,18] to
directly compare a distribution like p(sA | xV ,xA) to the data. This is
a mistake because xV and xA are internal representations that differ
from trial to trial and are not accessible to the experimenter. An
inferred distribution like p(sA | xV ,xA) will give rise to a single
estimate S ˆ
V or S ˆ
A as given by Equation 2. Only a histogram of
estimates over many simulated trials can be compared with
behavioral responses. This histogram will in many cases be very
different in shape from p(sA | xV ,x A). To fit the model to the data
we maximize the probability of the data given the model using the
multinomial likelihood.
Calculating the multinomial likelihood
We need to calculate the likelihood of the data given a model and
its parameters. Since the data take the form of counts of discrete
outcomes (1 to 5), we use the multinomial distribution. On each
trial, a response is drawn from a discrete probability distribution.
Each model produces numerical approximations to the probabil-
ities of each response in a given condition (sV,s A ). We will denote
these pi, with i=1, 2, 3, 4, 5. Suppose the observed response
counts in this condition are ni, with i=1, 2, 3, 4, 5. Then the
probability of observing counts {ni} under this model is:
pn i fg j pi fg ðÞ ~
n!
P
5
i~1
ni!
P
5
i~1
p
ni
i , ð14Þ
where n is the total number of trials in this condition, n~
P 5
i~1
ni,
and the prefactor n!=P
i ni! is the number of ways in which n
responses can be split up into five counts {ni}. This gives the
likelihood of the model given the data:
L modelj ni fg ðÞ !P
5
i~1
p
ni
i ð15Þ
Maximizing this likelihood is equivalent to maximizing its
logarithm, which is given by.
log L modelj ni fg ðÞ ~
P 5
i~1
ni log pizconstant: ð16Þ
So far we have considered a single condition. Since conditions
are independent of each other, the overall log likelihood is the sum
of the log likelihoods in all conditions. These overall log likelihoods
are compared for different models in Table 1 in the main text and
are used for fitting the parameters to the causal inference model
and all other models we are comparing to.
Data analysis for Table 1
We compare how good the causal inference model is relative to
other models. The way this is usually done within Bayesian
statistics is by calculating the Bayes factor, the ratio of the
likelihood of the data under one model to the likelihood of the data
under the other model, p(data|model1)/p(data|model2). As the
necessary integration of all nuisance parameters is infeasible we
Causal Inference
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corrected for the different number of free variables using the BIC
[45]. This ratio formalizes how much evidence the data provides
for one model relative to another model and is thus a very general
and mathematically precise way of quantifying the quality of
a model. According to the BIC the causal inference model is
preferable over the models that have fewer parameters. Table 1
reports the log maximal probability ratios for several models
relative to the causal inference model.
Data analysis for Figure 3
In these experiments, subjects report the perceived position by
pointing with a laser pointer. In such cases there may be additional
noise due to a misalignment of the cursor relative to the intended
position of the cursor. To model this, we introduce one additional
variable, motor noise. We assume that motor noise corrupts all
reports, is additive and drawn from a Gaussian with width smotor.
We estimate the relevant uncertainties as follows. In both auditory
and visual trials the noise will have two sources, motor noise and
sensory noise. We assume that visual only trials are dominated by
motor noise, stemming from motor errors and memory errors.
From data presented in figure 2 of other experiments [16] where
pointing responses are made in unimodal trials, we obtain
smotor=2.5u, and from the same graph we obtain sA=7.6u
(because variances are added linearly). These parameters were not
tuned. The other two parameters, pcommon and sP, were obtained
by minimizing the squared deviation of the model predictions
from the data. The choice of pcommon affects the judgment of unity
and thus strongly affects the bias graph as well as the commonality
judgments. Large values of pcommon lead to high bias and small
values of pcommon lead to bias values that are high only very close to
zero disparity. The same parameter values are used for both
graphs in figure 3.
SUPPORTING INFORMATION
Text S1 Supporting Information for ‘‘Causal inference in
multisensory perception’’
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000943.s001 (0.11 MB
DOC)
Figure S1 The interaction priors when fit to our dataset are
shown for the causal inference model, the Roach et al. [1] and the
Bresciani et al. priors[3].
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000943.s002 (1.15 MB EPS)
Figure S2 The average auditory bias, i.e. the relative influence
of the visual position on the perceived auditory position, is shown
as a function of the absolute spatial disparity (solid line, as in Fig. 2
main text) along with the model predictions (dashed lines). Red:
causal inference model. Green: behavior derived from using the
Roach et al prior. Purple: behaviour derived from using the
Bresciani et al prior.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000943.s003 (0.94 MB EPS)
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